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How are events surrounding the latest Iraq war shaping the future global political economy of oil?
The saliency of Iraq’s oil resources suggests a trend towards intensiﬁed great-power competition to
dominate energy-rich provinces and transportation corridors. Yet, the nature of the oil trade, Iraq’s
insurrection, and Sino-American economic interdependence indicate barriers to unilateral attempts
to control energy supplies. Based on examination of the Iraq conﬂict’s unintended stimulus to
terrorism and to China’s search for foreign oil supplies, this paper assesses three possible scenarios:
‘multiple energy insecurity’ (great-power competition and violent non-state reaction); ‘mutual energy
securitisation’ (inter-state collusion against non-state resource claimants); and ‘multiple energy
security’ (great-power curtailment of geographically expansive energy consumption). It ﬁnds that the
increasing problems associated with the ﬁrst two alternatives are inducing decision-makers to
contemplate policy options consistent with the third scenario.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Overview
The March 2003 Iraq invasion has been inextricably linked to that country’s oil.
Detractors posited that the war would allow Western oil companies to bring Iraq’s vast
hydrocarbon reserves into production, thereby solidifying asset values, lowering oil prices
for consumers and attenuating OPEC’s market power [1]. Feeding suspicions of the oil-war
nexus were remarks by then US Deputy Defence Secretary Paul Wolfowitz before
Congress that ‘‘The oil revenues of that country could bring between $50 billion and $100
billion over they next two or three years’’ [2]. Some detect a trend towards more frequent
recourse to US exercises of coercion to secure future energy supplies, in a context ofsee front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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author has commented, ‘‘Slowly but surely, the US military is being converted into a
global oil-protection service’’ [3, p. 7]. Thus, the ﬁrst Gulf War and the latest Iraq conﬂict
have revived once-dormant concerns over ‘resource war’ [3–5] and underscored the
resiliency of realist geopolitical thought [6,7].
This analytical purview rarely encompasses examination of the degree of commensur-
ability between force and energy security. The Iraq war has notably strengthened
America’s military position in the Gulf region without augmenting Iraq’s contribution to
global energy supplies. A ‘three-dimensional chessgame’ metaphor of international politics
[8, p. 39], indicating the difﬁculty of converting military pre-eminence into control over
outcomes in other dimensions, cautions against predicting energy-motivated incursions
elsewhere based on the Iraq case. Raw coercion is proving inapt not only for
discriminating among consumers in a fungible market, but also for defending an entire
global oil-supply chain offering multiple points of access; therefore, even superpowers pay
disproportionately higher prices to prevent, let alone engineer, disruptions.
Below, we discuss the extent to which the Iraq War allows for prognosticating more
great-power ‘resource wars.’ We then analyse three plausible Iraq-centric scenarios
impinging on the global political economy of oil. Forming the core of this evaluation,
the ﬁrst scenario, ‘multiple energy insecurity,’ suggests straight-line extrapolation from
the Iraq war towards escalation of energy-oriented Sino-American competition and
non-state resistance to great-power forays in local arenas. In a second scenario,
US-Chinese economic interdependence supports ‘mutual energy securitisation,’
where consuming powers collude to suppress non-state movements acting to impede
foreign investment. Rising costs in the ﬁrst scenario and the second’s impracticality leave
greater space for unfolding of the third scenario, ‘multiple energy security,’ where
consumption trajectories are lowered and local developing-world resource problems are
addressed.2. Extrapolating from the Iraq conﬂict
2.1. Auguring ‘resource war’
Certain indices point to the weight of energy-related motives in the US government’s
2003 decision to occupy Iraq. By 2000, petroleum’s contribution to total US energy
consumption, in terms of heat content (British thermal units), hovered at two ﬁfths, having
declined slightly from 1970 levels, but net oil imports supplied over one-ﬁfth of the 2000
ﬁgure, double its proportion 30 years earlier [9, pp. 9–11], and the 2000 ﬁgure is expected to
increase by another one third by 2025 [10, p. 163]. In the last three decades of the 20th
century, total daily US domestic petroleum output, despite a near trebling of reﬁnery
processing gains on domestic crude oil, declined by almost three million barrels, while net
imports increased by over seven million. In 2000, net imports exceeded half of all oil
consumed, then just under 20 million daily barrels, a ﬁgure projected to increase to 28
million by 2025. Even if 2000 domestic output can be maintained until 2025, an
assumption based on large expected increments to proved reserves and reﬁnery capacity,
only a doubling of 2000 net imports can sustain expanded consumption [9, p. 127, 10, pp.
40 and 216].
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consumption and its domination of oil imports, largely attributable to the growth of
automobile-orientated infrastructure [1]. During 1970–2000, almost exactly in tandem with
increases that raised imported oil to one quarter of total energy consumption by heat
content (US oil imports have never comprised less than four ﬁfths of total imported
energy), transportation, nearly all of its energy consumption requirement met by
petroleum, also expanded its share to just over one quarter of total energy usage,
although motor gasoline’s 70-percent share of the transportation component dropped by
seven percent [9, pp. 5 and 38–42 and 159].
Furthermore, Persian Gulf oil’s share of the import basket has grown. This portion
rose from less than four percent in 1970 to over one ﬁfth in 2000, and is projected to
exceed one quarter (previously attained in 1976–1978) by 2025. While the bulk of this
share comprises Saudi oil, even Iraq’s oil exports to the US grew by over 100-
fold from 1970 to cover over six percent of total US petroleum imports in both 1990 and
2001 [9, p. 133]. Acknowledging the elusiveness of energy self-sufﬁciency, post-war US
presidents have consistently backed using military force to ensure the ﬂow of Gulf oil.
The 1973–2003 period describes a trajectory of increasingly overt intrusions:
Nixon’s contingency plan to seize Gulf oilﬁelds during the 1973–1974 Arab oil embargo;
Reagan’s dispatch of naval forces to join a multinational ﬂeet protecting Strait of
Hormuz shipping during the 1980–1988 Iran–Iraq War; the senior Bush administration’s
UN-sanctioned 1991 authorisation of a US-led effort to repel Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
and the 2003 US-led, but UN-unsanctioned, invasion of Iraq by the second President
Bush.
Division exists on the extent of oil’s role in the latter pair of conﬂicts. If war has both
‘permissive’ causes that enable it and ‘efﬁcient’ causes that motivate it [11, pp. 224–238],
some, by stressing that the Soviet Union’s collapse left no country to balance US
power [12, pp. 183–184], relegate oil factors to constant background presence. However,
others argue that these conﬂicts herald a new phase of ‘resource war,’ implying
that ‘efﬁcient’ causes have become more salient, in line with aforementioned trends
and dire forecasts of a 2010 peaking in global oil production [5]. Answering the question
of what else should be occurring if the ‘resource war’ thesis is accurate, some logically
seek out evidence of conﬂict broiling elsewhere in the Gulf region, where two thirds
of the world’s proved oil reserves are located, and in other signiﬁcant energy-producing
regions [1, pp. 80–101, 3, pp. 74–101], a matter discussed in the context of Scenario
one below.
2.2. ‘Oil war’ as anomaly
Other evidence attenuates expectations of a wave of similar wars. While inadequate to
reverse declining US domestic oil extraction, post-1973 trends in price deregulation,
taxation and stockpiling have conditioned demand growth, output decline, and the impact
of supply disruptions. During 1978–1983, before the downward trend stopped, a 20-
percent drop in oil use lowered overall energy consumption by nearly one tenth and oil
imports by nearly two ﬁfths [9, pp. 9 and 127]. Moreover, improved energy efﬁciency and
the shift towards services reduced US energy spending as a share of GDP in 2000 to
slightly under 1970 levels while decreasing per-dollar energy consumption by over two
ﬁfths [9, p. 13]. Countering this general trend is the aforementioned resiliency of
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has promoted.
The 1970s price hikes that attended OPEC members’ nationalisation of multinational
corporate assets and the Arab embargo have actually enhanced ﬂexibility in the global oil
trade. The price rise undermined many producers’ interest in setting prices via contract
rather than the spot market, thereby reinforcing speculation-induced market volatility,
but it also complicated efforts to allocate the burden of collective production restraint [12,
pp. 168–169, 13, pp. 179–180, 189–191]. Commodity fungibility, facilitated by arbitrage
opportunities and the related capacity to re-direct tanker supplies to exploit them,
now renders discriminatory supply cuts ineffectual, as forces of supply ‘push’ and
demand ‘pull’ exert generalised and uniform impacts on consumer prices [14,15,
pp. 54–55]. As a result, for example, real costs to US reﬁners (in 2000 dollars) of
acquiring both domestic and imported crude oil increased from roughly equal levels
in 1973 to the equivalent maxima in 1981 before falling in tandem to 1973 levels in 1998 [9,
p. 173].
Even if market fungibility lowers the efﬁcacy of oil embargoes and high prices make
collective production restraints less sustainable, a two-decade diminution in major oil
producers’ spare capacity to less than 15 percent of its 1985 peak aggravates the market-
related effects of supply disruptions, though ampliﬁed price volatility spreads through the
world economy [16, pp. 3–6]. Yet, since the late 1970s, member countries of the
International Energy Agency have amassed oil stockpiles, notably the US Strategic
Petroleum Reserve, and agreed to emergency drawdowns [12, p. 202], although political
determination of emergency can delay release and thus hasten recession, as occurred after
Iraq’s 1990 invasion removed Kuwaiti output from the world market, but not when
Hurricane Rita impacted key concentrations of US hydrocarbon extraction, reﬁning and
transportation in 2005.
America’s consumption of one quarter of global energy and oil output, shares projected
to decrease only slightly in 2025 [10, pp. 163 and 167], makes oil inextricably part of its
Persian Gulf presence (as the assessment of beneﬁts and costs in [17, pp. 93–95]
underscores). In 2000, while accounting for 13 percent of US oil supplies, the Gulf
provided three tenths of the world’s crude oil [9, pp. 127 and 133]. Greater diversiﬁcation
of American oil imports has made many exporting countries relatively more dependent on
its markets. While the collective share of its imports from the following countries rose to
over two thirds in 2000, the US accounted for nearly one ﬁfth of Saudi exports, one
quarter of Iraq’s, two ﬁfths of Nigeria’s, 46 percent of Mexico’s, almost half of Venezuela’s
and nine tenths of Canada’s [9, pp. 133 and 307]. Moreover, while net oil imports
comprised one percent of US GDP in 2000, oil revenues ranged from 20 to 60 percent of
Venezuelan, Saudi and Iraqi GDPs and over four ﬁfths of their total export earnings [9,
pp. 13 and 83, 18, pp. 11–13].
An inapt instrument for supplying particular ﬁrms and consuming countries while
excluding others, US-launched ‘oil war’ would more likely stem from efforts to avert
globally generalised economic consequences of major supply disruptions. Concern will stay
ﬁxed on Saudi Arabia, which possesses 20–25 percent of world proved reserves, produces
12 percent of global oil, and holds most of the world’s spare capacity, but the focus will be
dominated less by ‘voluntary’ coordinated cutbacks than by the market’s capacity
to assimilate ‘involuntary’ shocks induced by national unrest and non-state terrorism
(see below).
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3.1. Non-state violence on the supply side
The aftermath of March–May 2003 coalition combat operations has yielded mixed
results for Iraq’s and its oil-sector’s recovery. Coalition forces succeeded in protecting the
Oil Ministry and oil infrastructure, of which maximum sustainable pre-2003 capacity had
fallen below 3 million daily barrels, from wartime damage. Unlike the ﬁrst Gulf War, when
retreating Iraqi forces destroyed 700 Kuwaiti oil wells, the later allied offensive prevented
damage to all but seven of Iraq’s 1500 wells. Occupation has also stabilised Iraq’s oil trade
relative to its status during the 1996–2003 U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme. After trebling
over a 3-year period, average daily Iraqi exports fell to 1.3 million barrels in the 12 months
(March 2002–February 2003) preceding invasion, with monthly standard deviation
comprising over one third of the average. During 2004–2005, respective average total and
US-bound oil exports rose to 1.5 million and 630,000 daily barrels, albeit at the expense of
local consumption, and their greater regularity is indicated by the narrowing of cross-
month standard deviations from over three ﬁfths of 2003–2004 averages to less than 15
percent for the latest period.1
Other indicators, however, suggest that war has lessened energy security. Over the ﬁrst
two full-year post-invasion periods (March 2003–February 2005), Iraq’s respective average
oil output, overall exports and domestic consumption remained, respectively, one quarter,
one ﬁfth and 35 percent below average corresponding levels in the six pre-war periods (see
footnote 1). In February 2005, output targets were revised downwards by 300,000–600,000
daily barrels to 2.5 million. This has limited Iraq’s revenues. By the end of the ﬁrst 24
months following invasion, the country had accumulated slightly over USD 25 billion in
export earnings [20, pp. 23–24], half of the lower bound of Wolfowitz’s notional target
range. Even these smaller ﬁgures incorporate an offsetting boost from higher average per-
barrel prices in 2004–2005, due in part to lower exports from Iraq, where instability may
have added a USD 10 premium [21].
Post-war constraints on Iraq’s output stem largely from an insurrection that has
targeted oil-sector activity, especially exports, while also deterring investment needed to
restore a deteriorating infrastructure. Through March 2005, Iraqi oil assets had been
attacked over 220 times, a number that rose to over 260 by the end of September of that
year [22]. The ﬁrst one in June 2003 shut down the Iraq–Turkey Pipeline, and subsequent
strikes have kept its throughput minimal, enforcing a post-war average daily export
shortfall of 300,000 barrels. Defending Iraq’s pipeline network has diverted more aid and
oil receipts towards security, including enlisting the services of tribes, some of whom have
engaged in a type of protection racketeering [23,24, p. 76]. However, the 7000-km expanse,
surface exposure and dilapidation of Iraq’s pipeline network dilute the efﬁcacy of these
measures.
Coercive energy security can be counterproductive to the extent that military
intervention incurs asymmetrically higher costs per unit of effort than denial of its1Monthly data spans from March 1997 to February 2005 inclusive and is arranged into eight equal 12-month
periods. Iraqi exports were compiled from all relevant issues of the IEA’s monthly Oil Market Report (see address
in [15]), while EIA data, applying to US oil imports from Iraq, is assembled from related issues of Monthly Energy
Review (see address in [19]).
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that the revolution in military affairs is shifting the balance of forces towards offensive
operations [4], other accounts contend that even overwhelming military power does not
confer universal leverage or yield greater beneﬁts. The ‘three-dimensional chessgame’
metaphor points to the difﬁculty of translating overwhelming ‘top board’ military power
into favourable outcomes on the ‘middle board,’ where economic power is more evenly
distributed among states, or on the ‘bottom board,’ where multifarious non-state actors, as
in Iraq, exert veto power [8, p. 39]. An analogous concept differentiates commanding ‘the
commons’ (sea, air and space) from victory in ‘contested zones,’ where otherwise weaker
adversaries are advantaged by terrain-based nationalist motivations and home-turf
familiarity [25]. In this case, the relatively less costly strategy of denying others their use of
seized oil facilities broadens the ‘chokepoint’ concept to encompass the entire global oil-
supply chain, not only its maritime corridors, but also conﬂict-prone areas traversed by
pipelines and worked by oil-sector personnel [23,26].
The Iraq war is metastasising networks of non-state resistance, involving terrorist
organisations and local insurrectionists, thus jeopardising long-term global spare
production capacity. As Colombia, Chechnya, Iraq, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia attest,
violence against oil infrastructure and personnel springs largely from speciﬁc grievances,
but Al Qaeda operatives can, depending on local circumstances, contextualise these events
within their global Islamist struggle. While some hypothesise that a radical group leading
an oil-rich country could ramp up output to undercut competitors [13, p. 172], others,
citing Osama Bin Laden’s 1998 declaration that per-barrel oil prices should be USD 144,
suggest that ‘‘the strict application of Islamic principles to oil depletion policy should
dictate y a slower rate of extraction that has historically been applied by Saudi Arabia
and many other Muslim countries’’ [1, p. 166]. The October 2002 suicide bombing of a
French oil tanker near Yemen, and possibly the failed April 2004 suicide attacks on Iraq’s
Khor Al-Amaya and Basra oil terminals, drew inspiration from Al Qaeda’s targeting of
‘‘the provision line and the feeding artery ofy the crusader nation’’ [27, p. 64]. Although
an estimated 6 percent of the Iraqi resistance in February 2005 comprised ‘foreign ﬁghters’
[20, p. 15], Jordanian-born combatant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi claimed in December 2004
to have been following Bin Laden’s orders to detonate a pipeline supplying reﬁned
products to Baghdad [22].
The exigency of restoring oil infrastructure highlights the critical role of foreign
companies and contractors, which has led terrorists to extend the corresponding ambit of
their operations. Though paling in comparison to the 14,000–24,000 Iraqi non-crime-
related casualties since war’s start [20, pp. 9–13], the killing of foreign contractors and Iraqi
personnel impedes oil industry’s rehabilitation. Shortly prior to the April 2004 attack on
Iraq’s oil terminals, an internet posting attributable to Al-Qaeda’s presumed leader in
Saudi Arabia stated that, ‘‘Strikes on oil wells and pipelines in Iraq may lead to the
withdrawal of foreign companies or at least destroy the security and stability needed by
them to plunder the wealth of Muslims’’ [28].
Similar problems afﬂict Saudi Arabia. Investment there is needed simply to sustain
existing production levels, let alone expand OPEC’s dwindling spare capacity. By early
2005, OPEC’s collective capacity expansion had barely offset respective declines from
Indonesia and Venezuela, and a plurality of this increase originated in Saudi Arabia, where
state oil company Aramco boosted capacity enough to reach a maximum sustainable
production capacity of 10–10.5 million daily barrels [29, pp. 12–14]. In line with IEA
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Saudi government has pledged to raise capacity to 15 million daily barrels by 2020 [30].
Even capacity maintenance presents problems. The aforementioned expansion has
merely arrested a signiﬁcant annual decline in older ﬁelds, with ‘supergiant’ Ghawar, which
produces half of Saudi crude, nearing its peak of production, indicated by increasing
reliance on costly water-injection recovery techniques [29, pp. 6–10, 30,31, p. 14]. This issue
is not entirely inseparable from security problems. The Saudi kingdom’s internal
opponents seek to sabotage oil operations, as in the summer 2002 attempt against Ras
Tanura, the world’s largest offshore oil-loading facility. The government spends large sums
on internal security. However, resentment at the Western presence in Iraq has provoked
terrorism against foreign civilians, as occurred in May 2003 and 2004 incidents, raising the
difﬁculty of recruiting the necessary expertise to expand future output capacity.
3.2. Geopolitical apprehensions over Chinese demand
Although this strategy did not commence with the Iraq war, the latter conﬂict seems to
have intensiﬁed China’s search for non-Persian Gulf oil. Its economy grew by nearly 10
percent per annum during 1977–2001 and is projected to continue expanding at 6 percent
over the 2001–2025 period, after which time Chinese GDP may trail only those of the
America and Japan [10, pp. 17–22]. Between 1990 and 2000, Chinese energy consumption
rose by over one third, equalling approximately one ﬁfth of the world increase, and is
forecasted to rise by another 146 percent until 2025, accounting for almost one quarter of
the global increment. Similarly, in the 1990s, oil consumption doubled, the increase
comprising over one ﬁfth of global expansion, and, by 2025, it is projected to rise by
another 167 percent, making up just under one ﬁfth of world growth [10, pp. 163 and 167].
During 1999–2004 alone, Chinese consumption grew by half, accounting for one third of
the global increase, to reach 6.4 million barrels [32, pp. 5–6]. A 20-percent yearly expansion
in automobile ownership could help China surpass the United States in number of cars by
2030, but larger transportation energy use, growing from 10 to 15 percent of total usage
over 2001–2025, will consume 5 million daily barrels, two-thirds of China’s additional oil
demand [10, pp. 29–32 and 163–167].
From 1993, when it ﬁrst became a net oil importer, until 2004, when it was importing oil
to meet just under half of its demand, Middle Eastern crude oil came to ﬁll more space in
its import basket. In 1993, China obtained slightly over two ﬁfths of its crude oil imports
from the Middle East, the same share as from its Asia-Paciﬁc neighbours, but 6 years later,
China was taking just under one half of imports from the Middle East, with Oman
remaining the largest of its Middle East suppliers, followed by Yemen, Iran and Saudi
Arabia [33, pp. 125–126]. In the early part of this century, the Middle East provided 45
percent of China’s oil imports, a share projected to rise to two thirds by 2025, from 900,000
to 5.7 million daily barrels [10, p. 40], in line with increased transportation uses.
This forecasted expansion, speciﬁcally of Persian Gulf oil imports, belies the notion that
the Iraq War will have lasting effects on China’s overseas oil activity. However, the run-up
to war most probably stimulated a jump in precautionary stock-building: China’s apparent
oil demand rose to an unprecedented monthly average high of 5.52 million daily barrels in
January 2003, while net crude oil and total oil imports also peaked, registering their largest
year-on-year and monthly gains until then [34, pp. 12 and 31]. This appears to have
dovetailed with the government’s February 2003 decision to create by 2005 a strategic
ARTICLE IN PRESS
P.A. Williams / Futures 38 (2006) 1074–1088 1081petroleum reserve holding 1 month’s national supply [35], although this idea originated in
the Tenth 5-Year Energy Plan (2001–2005) and acquired added impetus after the US
military campaign in Afghanistan [36, pp. 52–53].
The extent to which China is limiting its dependence on Middle Eastern oil is uncertain.
Oil companies of China, never a signiﬁcant importer of Iraq’s oil, agreed in June 1997 to
develop Iraq’s al-Ahdab ﬁeld to produce 90,000 daily barrels; however, this represented a
minor fraction of the contracts to augment Iraq’s output by 4.7 million daily barrels, and
the risk of losing this investment, which may have occurred in June 2003 [37, pp. 10–11],
constrained Sino-Iraqi interaction. During 2003–2004, China reduced its use of Middle
Eastern crude, from half to 45 percent of total imports, and within that basket, increased
imports from Oman while decreasing those from Saudi Arabia and Iran, although the
latter’s government concluded a notable October 2004 deal whereby a Chinese company
will buy liqueﬁed natural gas (LNG) and develop the Yadavaran oilﬁeld in exchange for
importing another 150,000 daily barrels of Iranian oil over the next 25 years [38, pp.
28–29].
Broader caution about expanding Persian Gulf oil importation reﬂects Chinese
awareness that the Strait of Hormuz serves as egress for 15 million daily barrels of oil,
of which 11 million, constituting one quarter of world trade and the source of three ﬁfths
of China’s oil, ply the pirate-infested waters of the Straits of Malacca on their way to East
Asia [26, pp. 8–9, 27, p. 67]. Interest in bypassing the latter waterway is reﬂected in
proposals to build a trans-Myanmar pipeline or a canal crossing Thailand’s Kra Isthmus,
and in the construction of an oil-tanker harbour in Gwadar, Pakistan, which could
eventually permit Persian Gulf oil to reach China via complementary overland links
connecting Karachi to Xinjiang [39, pp. 5–7]. However, these measures do not allay
China’s fear that ‘‘its most important source of petroleum imports, the Persian Gulf area,
lies at the end of very long sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) that are dominated by the
navy of a potential enemy’’ [36, p. 66]. As one Chinese (state) oil company source asserted,
‘‘it is very important for China to establish an onshore oil import channel’’ [40].
Consequently, China has adjusted its sights closer to home. Russian company Yukos
had been supplying most of China’s Russian oil imports via rail, which increased from
nearly six to nine percent of China’s total import basket during 2003–2004 [38, p. 28], and
agreed in June 2003 to construct a 2400-km pipeline to carry Siberian crude from Irkutsk
to Daqing, China’s large but maturing oil province. Although the Putin administration
later conﬁscated and sold off this company to pliable state outﬁts and tussles have
occurred over whether the pipeline should extend to China or to a Paciﬁc port nearer to
Japan, plans to build an initial pipeline spur in China’s direction suggest prioritisation of
Daqing [35,41].
China has also intensiﬁed its Kazakhstan activity, beginning with the 1997 purchase of a
60-percent share of Aktobemunaigaz company and ancillary rights to develop two oilﬁelds
in return for building a 3000-km pipeline linking Aktyubinsk to Xinjiang. Completed in
2003, the ﬁrst section connects the Aktobe ﬁeld to oil hub Atyrau, and in September 2004,
work began on a longer trunk line connecting Atasu to Xinjiang, where 200,000–400,000
daily barrels, meeting about 5 per cent of China’s 2006 oil demand, will be reﬁned and
shipped via an easterly artery paralleling the West-East natural gas pipeline to China’s
coast [35,42]. Astana, which has been shipping almost one quarter of its exports westward
by barge from Aktau across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and is seeking to raise port
capacity to 800,000 daily barrels, has interests in ensuring the success of the Sino-Kazakh
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oil westwards via the US-backed Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline [43–45], but also to
Kazakhstan’s dependence on trans-China ﬂow of Irtysh River water for hydropower, now
accounting for one ﬁfth of Kazakhstan’s electricity generation [42, p. 9].
Indeed, the Caspian region could emerge as a battleground on which foreign oil
companies carry out their respective parent governments’ national interests. Chinese oil
major lie under State Council auspices [36, p. 4], permitting commercially questionable
decisions like CNPC’s aforementioned 1997 Kazakh purchases. After August 2003, CNPC
increased ownership of Kazakhstan’s North Buzachi oilﬁelds and, 2 years later, bid USD 4
billion for Canada’s PetroKazakhstan and its ﬁelds [43,46]. The US government’s
quashing of China National Offshore Oil Corporation’s (CNOOC) bid allowed rival
Chevron-Texaco, owner of half of the Tengiz ﬁeld and 15 percent of the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium (CPC) pumping its oil to Russia’s Novorossiisk Port, to buy US company
Unocal’s 1/10th share of Azerbaijan’s offshore Azeri–Chirag–Guneshli output and its 9-
percent share of the BTC pipeline [47]. Compounding larger concerns, including Beijing’s
suspected efforts to obtain dual-use underwater terrain-mapping technology [36, p. 71, 48],
CNOOC’s bid raised the spectre, which Chevron-Texaco exploited, that ‘‘over time, oil will
be diverted to China on a non-commercial basis’’ [50, p. 69].
Beijing’s oil search may encroach on traditionally US-orientated exporting regions. In
2003–2004, the share of Chinese imports from Africa rose to 28 percent, and, while the
Sudanese proportion decreased slightly, the share from Angola, which was sending nearly
one quarter of its oil exports to China by 2001, rose to 13 percent in 2004 [38, pp. 28–29].
In Canada, Alberta province’s expansive tar sands deposits, where oil extraction is
economical only at USD 30 per barrel, generate a volume (capable of trebling by 2015)
equal to one third of Canada’s total, most of it exported southward [51,52], where, by
NAFTA’s terms, it has to continue [1, pp. 82–83]. Nonetheless, Chinese companies have
sought to help Canadian ﬁrm Enbridge to build a pipeline to deliver upgraded bitumen oil
to British Columbian ports and assist Trans-Mountain pipeline-operator Terasen in
expanding this westerly pipeline’s capacity and supplying oil tankers to defray Chinese
reﬁners’ cost of test-processing synthetic crude [38, pp. 30–31, 51, 52]. Resulting trade
could divert one third of Canada’s exports eastwards [53].
Chinese inroads into Latin America, notably Venezuela, are also deepening. Holding the
Western Hemisphere’s largest proven conventional oil reserves of 77 billion barrels, but
probably experiencing a permanent loss of 400,000 daily barrels as a result of a December
2002 strike, not from OPEC-related output cuts, Venezuela has advanced up US policy
agendas. Worsening US-Venezuelan relations is advantaging China. In late 2001, CNPC,
PetroChina and PdVSA joined on a project to produce high-quality synthetic Orimulsion
fuel that reportedly got underway in April 2004, and began building a complementary
Orimulsion-ﬁred power plant in China in November 2003 [69], matching Venezuelan plans
to double Orimulsion capacity to boost East Asian sales. President Hugo Chavez’s 2004
visit to Beijing resulted in a Chinese agreement to develop 15 eastern Venezuelan oilﬁelds,
build reﬁneries there and import fuel oil, complementing trilateral plans to build a trans-
Columbian pipeline by-passing the Panama Canal [49,54]. This partially substantiates
Chavez’s 2004 statement that ‘‘now we are free andy make our resources available to the
great country of China’’ [53]. The potential future importance of these supplies in China’s
oil-import basket may challenge the basis for the conventional geopolitical inference that
‘‘what happens in South America does not matter very much to US citizens’’ [6, p. 258].
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On the other hand, this scenario also consists of China’s geographically expansive search
for energy supplies, as it has for the US, confronting non-state actors seeking to resist these
forays. This could affect the supply of oil reaching, originating in, or leaving China’s
northwest Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Including the Sino-Kazakh pipeline and
the overland route originating in Pakistan, projects involving Xinjiang ﬁt into a larger 1996
Chinese oil-industry scheme that depends on enticing foreign companies to invest in
developing both the Taklamakan Desert’s Tarim Basin in Xinjiang, where 144 million
barrels was reportedly extracted in 2002, and in building a 4000-km eastwards pipeline
from there to Shanghai [36, pp. 21–25].
The military presence in the project area suggests an abiding concern to suppress
opposition to these projects that could actually catalyse it. Given the possibility that
Turkic separatists opposed to its ‘Haniﬁcation’ will target Xinjiang’s dense energy-
infrastructure array, the West-East natural gas pipeline (much like the BTC pipeline
pumping Azeri oil to Turkey’s Ceyhan Port) is being buried underground [36, p. 62], and
Xinjiang has emerged as the People Liberation Army’s (PLA) premier centre for testing
new warfare tactics and equipment and has hosted joint Sino-Pakistani counter-terrorism
exercises [55]. Chinese contractors remain vulnerable in Pakistan, as construction of the
aforementioned Gwadar–Xinjiang overland passageway has catalysed oppositional
networks drawing both from displaced Uighur Turk populations residing in Pakistan,
where the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement’s (ETIM) erstwhile head was killed, and
Baluch nationalists who have kidnapped and killed several Chinese project engineers [56,
pp. 7–8].
4. Scenario two: mutual energy securitisation
Relative-gains thinking characterising certain realms of interaction may not intensify
great-power conﬂict when absolute gains from larger mutual interdependence outweigh
them [57, p. 123]. In this scenario, economic growth underlying increases in China’s
imported oil demand may even reinforce an overarching Sino-American interdependence
that promotes in oil-interest convergence. China has been running a USD 150-billion-plus
trade surplus with the US, leading the latter to threaten import protections, permitted to
an extent under the terms of China’s 2001 WTO accession, and pressure Beijing to raise its
currency value. Yet, the latter’s willingness to cover US deﬁcit-ﬁnancing of imported goods
by investing over USD 700 billion of foreign exchange reserves in US securities returns a
stream of beneﬁts to the US [58,pp. 12–16, 59] that allow it to purchase high-priced
imported oil.
Some oil interests, however, are inherently mutual. Although Beijing has been directing
Chinese oil ﬁrms to acquire overseas assets since the ninth 5-Year Plan (1996–2000), it also
seeks to attract foreign investment. A 1998 corporate re-organisation allowed CNPC’s
subsidiary PetroChina, Sinopec and CNOOC to raise over USD 6.5 billion in stock, giving
British Petroleum a one-ﬁfth stake in PetroChina and, along with ExxonMobil and Shell,
part of a 15-percent minority share in Sinopec, while resulting in Shell’s USD 200-million
purchase of CNOOC shares [35]. By 1997, the government was opening large swatches of
land, including Tarim Basin, to foreign investors, resulting in USD 770 million in signed
contracts with 35 companies; 6 years later, it was inviting outside ﬁrms to develop the
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of China’s output, largely on the strength of drilling work by outside ﬁrms, including
Chevron-Texaco, the rival bidder for Unocal, which, together with Shell, withdrew from
the CNOOC-led East China Sea project, depriving CNOOC of needed deepwater
exploration technology and expertise [60].
As long as China essentially pays for US purchases of its own goods, the US military will
be less amenable, even if it could, to cutting fuel supplies than to collaborating to suppress
non-state sources of supply disruption. The aforementioned willingness of Chinese
companies to invest in Iran, Beijing’s cooperative gestures towards Washington over Iraq,
including pledges of reconstruction aid, signing Security Council Resolution 1546 to
approve stationing US-led multinational forces and re-opening its Baghdad embassy [61],
and China’s dilatory backing of ASEAN’s anti-piracy centre [36, p. 65], imply that Chinese
leaders will continue to calculate a highly unfavourable cost-beneﬁt ratio in substituting
for provision of sea-lane safety and Gulf stability [33, p. 135].
Indeed, China and the United States could have a mutual interest in ‘securitisation’ of
energy supplies, depicting non-state resistance ‘‘as an existential threat, requiring
emergency procedures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political
procedure’’ [62, pp. 23–24]. In 2002, when his government was lifting restrictions on ofﬁcial
aid and funding counter-terrorism efforts in two BTC countries, Azerbaijan and Georgia,
US State Department ofﬁcial Richard Armitage visited Beijing, where he supported
classifying the Uighur ETIM as terrorist [36, p. 58]. Yet, this example also highlights
inherent practical limits to this strategy, given China’s preferences for cooperating with its
Russia and Central Asian partners in the anti-Islamist, albeit anti-democratic, Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Calls for investigation into Tashkent’s violent 2005
crackdown on dissent inﬂuenced SCO’s request for a deadline to be set for US military
withdrawal from member territories and Tashkent’s decision to close American bases [63].
5. Scenario three: multiple energy security
In this case, the energy-consuming powers take action to lower (geographically)
expansive consumption proﬁles, thereby also widening potential space for local resource
claims to be addressed. This anti-geopolitical economy of oil would seem unlikely to
materialise except for the mounting difﬁculties associated with the previous two scenarios.
This scenario features reduction of US and Chinese domestic energy consumption,
especially in the transportation sector, via market-governed regulation (i.e., rationalisation
of subsidies and raising of gasoline taxes), higher energy-use efﬁciency and technological
innovation, transfer of which US and Chinese membership in the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) could facilitate. In some circumstances, however, environmental
problems could worsen.
As previously indicated, increasing oil imports are directly attributable to higher levels
of personal access to motor transport. Post-1973 enhancements in US corporate average
fuel efﬁciency (CAFE), applicable to passenger vehicles and achievable only under ideal
driving conditions, peaked at 8 litres/100 km (27.5miles per gallon, or mpg) in 1987, when
lower oil prices enabled a resurgence of Persian Gulf Oil imports to meet an expanding
proportion of sales comprised by larger passenger vehicles (attaining less than 20mpg),
which meet lower CAFE standards and even receive large tax credits [17,64, p. 25]. Actual
mean fuel-efﬁciency rates of all US motor vehicles increased by over one quarter between
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[9, p. 57]. Moreover, moving a single passenger consumes nearly 98 percent of the original
oil extracted to run the car [65, p. 57]. Chinese fuel consumption per kilometre exceeds
developed-country levels by 10–20 percent [10, pp. 32–33].
Trends suggest that higher oil prices reﬂect, and have been advancing, shifts in energy
consumption. At one level, rising prices reﬂect stronger environmental concerns, thereby
promoting increased consumption of relatively scarcer supplies of less sulphuric crude-oil
blends, which also exerts demand ‘pull’ on the more sour blends via the concomitantly
higher proﬁt margins associated with tailoring fuel qualities to meet stringent emission
standards. However, this in turn is straining extant reﬁnery capacity, its expansion
potential already constrained by future proﬁt-margin uncertainty and siting restrictions,
supporting OPEC ofﬁcials’ assertions that high prices are less attributable to overall lack
of crude supplies than to a reﬁnery shortage [66], especially in the US, where, although
average per-reﬁnery capacity increased almost 150 percent during 1970–2000, number of
reﬁneries decreased by over two ﬁfths [9, p. 143].
Regardless of their cause, higher oil prices and their perceived geopolitical ramiﬁcations
are nonetheless altering energy-use patterns. Even if lack of political will precludes gasoline
tax hikes in China and the US (where respective 2000 retail prices were one third and two
ﬁfths of Japan’s), which could help raise their rates to the latter’s 35-mpg. standard [9, p.
313, 17, p. 207], lower large-vehicle sales rates and increased purchases of more fuel-
efﬁcient vehicles reﬂect growing inﬂuence of a coalition, joining otherwise disparate groups
of environmentalists, religious conservatives and geo-strategists, that favours radically
improving transportation’s energy efﬁciency. Their strategy centres on wider incorporation
of available technology, like ‘plug-in’ capacity for hybrid electric vehicles, which could
reduce gasoline consumption by 85 percent while doubling existing fuel efﬁciency to
100mpg, and ﬂexible-fuel modiﬁcations, which, if supplementing ‘plug-in’ features, could
raise fuel efﬁciency by another magnitude of ﬁve. These would lower 2025-projected
expansion of US oil imports by nearly 8 million daily barrels, capping volumes near
current levels [67].
The key potential trade-off inherent in this strategy lies in the need to generate more
electricity, which relies mostly on coal burning. China and the US, respectively posses over
1/10th and one quarter of the world’s proven coal reserves and generate four ﬁfths and
three ﬁfths of their electrical power from coal, but there exist no practical means of
sequestering most of coal’s carbon dioxide emissions [10, pp. 76–77, 17, p. 232]. Trends
project US and Chinese respective coal consumption to rise by two ﬁfths and three
quarters over the 2000–2025 period, accounting for one ﬁfth and three ﬁfths of world
growth and equalling one ﬁfth and over one third of the world’s total 2025 consumption,
while respective coal-based carbon dioxide emissions are expected to increase by two ﬁfths
and 114 percent, comprising nearly similar shares of world growth (nearly one third of
total emissions growth) and the 2025 world total [10, pp. 169–175].
These forecasts suggest barriers to increasing general levels of compliance with the 2012
emission-reduction targets entailed in Kyoto Protocol’s Annex One, which neither the US
nor China has signed [10, p. 42, 36, p. 76]. Yet, efforts to raise the 20–25 percent share of
Chinese coal supply that is washed could exacerbate water shortages that may be raising
the conﬂict proﬁle of Chinese upstream uses on international rivers, but this problem and
related transportation bottlenecks might otherwise be alleviated via rail-system improve-
ments, coal-slurry pipelines, coal liquefaction and gasiﬁcation and collocating power
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use to veto the attainment of stricter global environmental standards.
6. Conclusion
Reducing geographically expansive oil consumption could yield multiple beneﬁts
running the gamut of geopolitical, economic and even the environmental concerns, if
adherence to higher emission–reduction standards compels the implementation of less
wasteful processes. None of these outcomes are preordained by extrapolating from present
trajectories and they may even contradict each other at some level. Yet, events consistent
with an unfolding of the third scenario could allow for considering how to boost minimum
per-capita levels of energy use to a level that might allow for more sustainable population
growth rates in the developing world, which accounts for a rising share of energy use and
emissions. Compared to developed-world counterparts, the average user in developing
nations consumes less than one ﬁfth, corresponding to a quantity considered to be an
important development threshold [65, p. 38]. One manifestation of this problem is
exempliﬁed in the case of Iraq, where post-invasion domestic oil consumption has fallen by
over one third, and even in China, where mean per-capita energy use is 1/15th that of the
US. Suggesting available room for reform, corrective measures will probably include
efforts to rationalise price structures and increase incentives for reducing smuggling of
reﬁned products and raising domestic output and usage efﬁciency, problems afﬂicting most
of the developing world including Iraq and China [24,68]. Nonetheless, lowering the
geopolitical proﬁle of imported energy-supply races will aid in increasing the political
saliency and urgency of these domestic market-oriented measures.
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